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Feature Essay
Winter 2013
Miller, Randall CIVIL WAR SESQUICENTENNIAL: The Election(s) of 1860.
By all accounts, the election of 1860 was what political scientists would
later term a “critical election"--that is, an election that reflected and/or affected a
significant shift in party alignments and/or brought about a significant shift in
policies that reflected and/or affected political behavior thereafter, at least for a
generation. Without benefit of political scientists’ methodology or terminology,
the American people in 1860 understood that the election was critical and that
they needed to stand up to be counted. Indeed, scholars have estimated that more
than 81 percent of the eligible voters cast ballots in 1860, making it the second
highest percentage turnout in American history. But what had the voters decided
in 1860? That question beggared contemporaries and nagged scholars thereafter.
The most critical question about the election was not who won, but whether
those who had lost would accept the result. And this, more than examinations of
the election itself, has been the focus of new work on the meaning of 1860.
Many studies going back to Allen Nevins and continuing to recent
publications have noted how threats of disunion coming from southern
“fire-eaters" in the late 1850s into the 1860 election cycle disrupted ordinary
political processes and then fractured the Democratic Party, leading to the
Republican electoral victory. By some accounts, especially those focusing on
southern honor that result almost demanded that southerners honor their threats
that any Republican gain would mean secession, lest they lose face at home and
credibility in history. Whether out of a crisis of fear after John Brown’s raid and
“northern" triumph at the polls and/or anger and frustration at their diminishing
political prospects in Washington, white southerners gave the day to the
secessionists in the other elections of 1860—namely, those choosing delegates to
the secession conventions in the deep South. In doing so, they in effect decided
that they owed no loyalty to an electoral process that had sustained the republic
since the first contested elections of Washington’s and Jefferson’s day. They set
about “electing" a new government in forming a Confederate States of America
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and urging other states to join them. All this is almost consensus among
historians, though they sometimes differ over the details and daily dynamics of
the secession process.
Scholars essaying the election also note two vital facts that undermined
defeated southerners’ willingness to accept Lincoln’s “authority" as
president-elect or even the legitimacy of his election. One fact was that Lincoln’s
election owed entirely to northern votes. Boding ill for acceptance of any
Republican victory in the national election was the refusal of deep southern
states even to have Republican electors on a ballot. Not surprisingly, Lincoln did
not win a single slave state or even a majority in any congressional district in
one. A second and related problem was that Lincoln “won" with less than 40
percent of the popular vote, and with not so much as one vote in many southern
districts. As a minority president who gained the Electoral College victory on a
regional vote, Lincoln hardly had a political claim to southern acceptance of his
victory. He did have a constitutional one, which secessionists refused to respect.
But it would be fears of a supposedly antislavery president and party more than
the circumstances of Lincoln’s election that caused secessionists to win their
own elections to take their states out of the Union before Lincoln could be
inaugurated and do any damage to their interests. Again, on that subject, scholars
generally agree.
Less agreement comes when considering Lincoln’s actions as president-elect
to secure his election. The initiative came from seceding southern states that did
not even wait on Lincoln’s inauguration to reject the results of the election. As
president-elect, Lincoln sought to arrest the process of secession by giving
reassurances to the South that his administration posed no direct threat to slavery
and southern interests. On December 22, 1860, he wrote as much in a private
letter to his erstwhile friend and former Whig colleague Alexander Stephens of
Georgia that “Do the people of the South really entertain the fears that a
Republican administration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with their
slaves, or with them, about their slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you, as once
a friend, and still, I hope not an enemy, that there is no cause for such fears. The
South would be in no more danger in this respect, than it was in the days of
Washington." The letter was somewhat disingenuous for Lincoln surely knew
that Republicans in power would try to confine slavery and otherwise limit its
growth and power, as was their principal reason-for-being and the expectation of
those northerners who had voted for them in 1860. But it was also an honest
effort to convince supposedly non-radical southerners to let the political process
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play out normally and thereby to buy time for unionism to reassert itself. Doing
so would give the nation a chance to accept the result of the election rather than
coming apart over it. Whether Lincoln bet too much on supposed southern
unionists rallying to reverse the secession tide is an issue much debated among
scholars. Just so in considering the extent to which Lincoln actually believed his
words and actions—really non-actions—would work.
As efforts to bring the seceded states back into the Union failed during the
“secession winter" and as a crisis loomed at Fort Sumter, Lincoln was sworn in
as president and Republicans took their seats in a Congress that, with members
of the seceded states now gone, gave them a party majority. How they managed
such a transition to power is the subject of some debate among historians, though
surprisingly little recent work has examined that process and its implications for
translating an electoral “victory" into Republican policy. Seemingly, though, the
Republicans had “won" the election.
But, to judge by recent work on Lincoln taking office, Lincoln knew he had
to make a case for the necessity of recognizing and respecting the result of the
election in a way that did not emphasize Republican triumph. In his March 4,
1861, inaugural address he sought again to allay southern fears about Republican
intentions by insisting that they would respect the Constitution and make no
aggressive moves against the South, while also declaring the illegality and
impracticality of secession and promising that the Union would defend its
fundamental interest in self-preservation. More important, he explained why it
was necessary for southerners to accept the result of the election when he
observed that “Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy."
Once begun, it can have no end, and the great experiment in self-government
that God anointed and history required would collapse. The election of 1860 thus
was about the validity, credibility, and sustainability of the electoral process
itself.
Circumstances and events ended any prospect of secessionists honoring the
election result. The seceded states had no interest in returning to a Union that
they believed fundamentally had rejected their interests in protecting slavery,
and the necessity of legitimating their own new government soon drove them to
seize federal property and then to attack Fort Sumter. And the war came.
For contemporaries and many historians, the ordeal by fire that came in
1861 defined the meaning of the election(s) of 1860. Many historians have
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focused on the causes and consequences of southern fears about an “impending
crisis" over slavery and explained the election(s) in terms of southern
preoccupations more than northern concerns. Also, many studies have taken the
long view of the election, examining, for example, the rise and fall of the second
American party system, the emergence of a distinctly (and increasingly abrasive)
sectional politics in the 1850s, and the simultaneous groundswell of
anti-partyism among fire-eating southerners and antislavery northerners that
made political compromise anathema. Such studies showed the structural failures
in an American party system designed to keep the divisive slavery issue out of
public discourse and electoral considerations and a culture of politics that thrived
on pugnacious electioneering, conspiracy theories, and personality over
principle.
Although scholars have disagreed on any “inevitability" about the crack-up
as occurred in 1860-1861 or about the extent to which non-party or anti-party
radicals disrupted the political system to the point where it was incapable of
righting itself amid a decade of sectional rancor, those scholars generally have
framed discussion of the election(s) of 1860 in dialectics, with the initiatives
principally coming from southern demands for slavery’s expansion and
protection and the reactions from northerners increasingly adamant to assert their
own “free soil" and other interests by the late 1840s (David Goldfield in America
Aflame almost alone places the onus on a northern evangelical moralism starting
and impelling distrust and disunion). Doing so has made understanding southern
fears seemingly more important than northern ones. And it has left the focus on
the election(s) of 1860 largely a matter of explaining how the war came rather
than how contemporaries understood and acted on their interests in those
elections. It also has discounted the importance of intraparty differences and
internal struggles within the states, especially northern ones, in explaining the
successes of particular Republicans and Democrats at the polls and southern
secession afterward.
To be sure, scholars such as Eric Foner, William Gienapp, Tyler Anbinder,
and others re-oriented the focus on politics toward considerations of northern
political identities and interests. They did so by showing that northerners pushed
their own initiatives in trying to contain a “slave power" and defined themselves
in terms of the “free soil" principles that created and held together a Republican
party in the 1850s and even informed northern Democratic politics at the same
time. In their telling, the North-South dialectic derived its energy from northern
as much as southern imperatives and impulses. And the stakes were so high that
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“the people" turned out to vote for their interest in record numbers. Such interest
carried with it ever greater expectations that the men who sought their votes
would act on them, with manly courage and without hesitation or equivocation.
They expected elections to bring results. This was as true for northerners as for
southerners.
What is needed now is a fuller exploration of those northern interests and
imperatives. Recent work by Adam Goodheart, Harold Holzer, Douglas Egerton,
and especially Russell McClintock has emphasized the energy and anger of
northerners, who organized as Wide-Awakes and other political clubs to press
for Republican victory and then to demand that Republicans make no
concessions to southerners refusing to respect that victory. Scholars remind us
that the election of 1860 was in fact many elections—the presidential one
conducted in the South between a split Democratic party, with Stephen A.
Douglas and John C. Breckinridge pitted against one another, the one in the
border states where the Union party sought to keep a peace by beating
Republicans and Democrats of all stripes, and the one in the northern states
between the Douglas Democrats and the Republicans. We know much about
those particular contests, but what is not so well understood is how the elections
worked out, on the ground, in the northern states and how the expectations
coming from the many state and local elections defined and directed what people
demanded of winner and loser alike. It was not only southerners who viewed the
election as a test of union and honor.
Thinking about the election(s) of 1860 in more local terms will help make
sense of its national significance and will enlarge the scope of inquiry to give
northern ideas and interests equal consideration in explaining how and why the
consequences of the election(s) of 1860 proved so difficult to contain within
traditional political categories. It also will take the focus of the election(s) of
1860 from preoccupations with political elites to examinations of the people on
the ground. Doing so will provide the kind of people’s history for the politics of
the day that will help make sense of what people wanted and expected the
election to realize, whether on the winning or losing side.
Randall Miller is Professor of History at Saint Joseph’s University, has
written on various aspects of slavery, the Civil War, and Reconstruction. Among
his many books, he has forthcoming, co-edited with Paul Cimbala, a collection
of essays on the “unfinished" Civil War.
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